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ESSAY

Kiobel and Extraterritoriality:
A Rule Without a Rationale
DAVID L. SLOSS†

Analysis of recent judicial decisions applying the presumption
against extraterritoriality indicates that U.S. courts and commentators
invoke at least four different rationales for the presumption: an
international law rationale; a domestic political science rationale; an
international relations rationale; and a domestic judicial policy
rationale. This Essay briefly discusses each rationale and its
application to Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.1 I conclude that
neither of the first two rationales offers a persuasive justification for
applying the presumption against extraterritoriality to limit
extraterritorial application of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)2 in Kiobel.
The U.S. Supreme Court purported to apply an international relations
rationale in Kiobel, but that rationale requires judicial deference to
the foreign policy judgment of the political branches, and the
majority in Kiobel defied the Obama Administration‘s foreign policy
preferences. Finally, I conclude that the domestic judicial policy
rationale is problematic because it manifests judicial hostility to
democratic lawmaking.
I.

THE INTERNATIONAL LAW RATIONALE

Historically, the presumption against extraterritoriality began as
a presumption against extra-jurisdictionality.3 In other words, it was a
presumption that courts should not apply U.S. law extraterritorially in
†

Professor of Law and Director, Center for Global Law and Policy, Santa Clara University School
of Law.

1. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
3. See John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT‘L L.
351, 352 (2010) (―For most of U.S. history, the Supreme Court . . . . applied a presumption
against extrajurisdictionality: that is, a presumption that federal law does not extend beyond
the jurisdictional limits set by international law.‖ (footnote omitted)).

241

11-Sloss

242

8/28/2013 9:26 PM

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 28:241

violation of international legal rules limiting the jurisdictional reach
of national laws.4 Throughout the nineteenth century, international
law imposed strict jurisdictional limits on the extraterritorial
application of domestic statutes.5 In practice, the presumption against
extraterritoriality was an application of the Charming Betsy canon6—
a canon that encouraged courts to construe U.S. statutes in
conformity with international legal rules.7
During the first half of the twentieth century, the international
law rationale for the presumption against extraterritoriality became
untenable because international law changed. The Permanent Court
of International Justice decided the Lotus case in 1927.8 Lotus
established a permissive rule: states can apply their laws
extraterritorially unless there is a specific prohibition barring the
extraterritorial application of domestic law. The court said:
Far from laying down a general prohibition to the
effect that States may not extend the application of
their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to
persons, property and acts outside their territory,
[international law] leaves them in this respect a wide
measure of discretion which is only limited in certain
cases by prohibitive rules . . . .9
After Lotus, international law no longer imposed strict limits on the
extraterritorial application of domestic statutes.10

4. Id.
5. David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge, International Law in the
Supreme Court to 1860, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY
AND CHANGE 7, 38 (David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge eds., 2011)
[hereinafter CONTINUITY AND CHANGE].
6. See William S. Dodge, Morrison’s Effects Test, 40 SW. L. REV. 687, 687 (2011)
(―The presumption against extraterritoriality was born from the marriage of the Charming
Betsy canon . . . and an international law rule that jurisdiction was generally territorial.‖).
7. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (―[A]n
act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains . . . .‖).
8. S.S. ―Lotus‖ (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
9. Id. at 19.
10. Knox, supra note 3, at 355 n.30; see also Dan E. Stigall, International Law and
Limitations on the Exercise of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in U.S. Domestic Law, 35
HASTINGS INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 323, 331 (2012) (―In [Lotus], the Permanent Court of
International Justice articulated the fundamental rule that prescriptive jurisdiction – the
ability of a government to prescribe law relating to certain activity – is permissive in
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In Kiobel, the defendants argued that international law prohibits
U.S. courts from applying U.S. law extraterritorially to ―foreigncubed‖ cases—i.e., cases involving foreign plaintiffs, foreign
defendants, and foreign conduct.11 This argument is clearly
untenable. As an initial matter, it is debatable whether the Kiobel
plaintiffs were even asking U.S. courts to apply U.S. law
extraterritorially.12 Arguably, it would be more accurate to say that
the Kiobel plaintiffs were asking U.S. courts to apply international
law extraterritorially. If that is an accurate description of the case,
then it is unclear why the presumption against extraterritoriality is
even relevant.
Setting aside that issue, this Essay assumes that Kiobel can fairly
be characterized as a case involving the extraterritorial application of
U.S. law. Even so, the international law rationale cannot justify
application of the presumption against extraterritoriality in Kiobel. In
the year 2013, there is no blanket rule of international law that
prohibits States from enacting legislation to regulate the activities of
foreigners in foreign countries. Nor is there any rule of international
law that prohibits domestic courts from exercising jurisdiction over
foreign-cubed cases. To the contrary, the universality principle is a
widely accepted principle of international law that authorizes States
to apply their laws extraterritorially to address heinous conduct that
violates universal human rights norms.13 The universality principle is
not limited to criminal cases; it applies equally to civil cases.14
international law and, unless a prohibition to prescriptive jurisdiction is proved, a state may
properly claim jurisdiction. . . . The International Court of Justice has reaffirmed the
enduring force of this rule as recently as 2010, noting that the rule articulated in Lotus
remains a cornerstone of the international law of jurisdiction.‖ (alteration in original)).
11. See Supplemental Brief for Respondents at 37, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491) (―[T]he Charming Betsy canon also bars application of
U.S. law to a ‗foreign-cubed‘ ATS case . . . .‖).
12. See Anthony J. Colangelo, Kiobel: Muddling the Distinction Between Prescriptive
and Adjudicative Jurisdiction, 28 MD. J. INT‘L L. 65 (2013).
13. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
§ 404 cmt. a (1987) (―Universal jurisdiction over [some] offenses is a result of universal
condemnation of those activities and general interest in cooperating to suppress them, as
reflected in widely-accepted international agreements and resolutions of international
organizations. These offenses are subject to universal jurisdiction as a matter of customary
law.‖).
14. Id. § 404 cmt. b (―In general, jurisdiction on the basis of universal interests has been
exercised in the form of criminal law, but international law does not preclude the application
of non-criminal law on this basis . . . .‖); see also Donald Francis Donovan & Anthea
Roberts, The Emerging Recognition of Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 100 AM. J. INT‘L L. 142,
153 (2006) (―It could be said, then, that though embryonic, state practice endorsing the
exercise of universal civil jurisdiction as a permissive customary norm is beginning to
emerge.‖).
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Assuming that the Kiobel plaintiffs‘ allegations are true,
extraterritorial jurisdiction is consistent with international law
because it falls within the scope of the universality principle.
In sum, the universality principle authorizes states to exercise
jurisdiction extraterritorially in cases like Kiobel. Therefore, insofar
as the Supreme Court wants to preclude application of the ATS to
foreign-cubed cases, it cannot legitimately invoke an international
law rationale to justify that outcome.
II. THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SCIENCE RATIONALE
In the middle of the twentieth century, when the Supreme Court
recognized that international law no longer supported the
presumption against extraterritoriality, the Court developed a new
rationale for the presumption. In Foley Brothers. v. Filardo,15 the
Court announced that the presumption against extraterritoriality ―is
based on the assumption that Congress is primarily concerned with
domestic conditions.‖16 Filardo changed the rationale supporting the
presumption from an international law rationale to a domestic
political science rationale.17
The basic idea is straightforward. Congressmen want to get reelected. Hence, when they introduce legislation, they tend to focus
primarily on how that legislation will affect their constituents.18
Therefore, when courts interpret legislation, they should assume that
Congress wanted to use the legislation to shape events domestically,
not overseas, unless a contrary intention is manifest. This rationale
generally makes sense as long as the presumption against
extraterritoriality is rebuttable. However, litigants should be able to
rebut the presumption by providing specific evidence that Congress
enacted a particular statute to influence foreign affairs, not just to
shape domestic affairs.
No one seriously disputes the proposition that Congress enacted
the ATS to influence foreign affairs. Congress‘ primary goal when it
enacted the ATS was to reduce a source of friction with important
15. 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
16. Id. at 285.
17. See Melissa A. Waters, International Law as an Interpretive Tool in the Supreme
Court: 1946-2000, in CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, supra note 5, at 380, 386–88.
18. Cf. id. at 387.
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U.S. allies.19 During the 1780s, before ratification of the Constitution,
the United States lacked a central authority capable of enforcing
international obligations. The national government‘s inability to
enforce international obligations created diplomatic tensions with
both Britain and France.20 The Framers‘ desire to ensure effective
enforcement of international obligations and promote harmonious
relations with key allies was a central reason for adopting the
Constitution.21 It was also the primary reason for including the ATS
in the 1789 Judiciary Act.22 The legislative intention is evident on the
face of the statute, which provides federal courts jurisdiction over
claims by aliens who sue ―for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.‖23 The textual
focus on aliens and international law demonstrates that Congress was
concerned with foreign affairs, not domestic affairs, when it enacted
the ATS.
Thus, the domestic political science rationale does not support
application of the presumption against extraterritoriality to restrict
extraterritorial application of the ATS because the historical evidence
demonstrates conclusively that Congress was not ―primarily
concerned with domestic conditions‖ when it enacted the ATS.24
III. THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS RATIONALE
In F. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Empagran S.A.,25 Justice Breyer
asserted that U.S. courts should construe statutes so as to ―take
account of the legitimate sovereign interests of other nations.‖26 He
cited Charming Betsy to support this proposition, but the traditional
Charming Betsy canon does not support his claim. The Charming
Betsy canon focuses on international law: courts should interpret
statutes to avoid violations of international law.27 Justice Breyer‘s
analysis focuses on international relations: courts should consider the
19. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715–20 (2004) (discussing the historical
context of the enactment of the ATS).
20. See Sloss, Ramsey & Dodge, supra note 5, at 9–12 (discussing the conflict with
Britain over the 1783 peace treaty and a Pennsylvania Supreme Court case involving French
subjects).
21. Id. at 11.
22. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715–20.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
24. Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
25. 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
26. Id. at 164.
27. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
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legitimate sovereign interests of other countries.28 Empagran is one
of several recent cases in which Supreme Court Justices have invoked
an international relations rationale to justify application of the
presumption against extraterritoriality.29 Although the international
relations rationale supports application of the presumption against
extraterritoriality in some cases, it does not justify the Supreme
Court‘s application of the presumption in Kiobel.
In his opinion for the Court in Kiobel, Chief Justice Roberts
invoked an international relations rationale to justify the presumption
against extraterritoriality.30 He also emphasized the separation-ofpowers principles that are a key feature of the international relations
rationale. In particular, Chief Justice Roberts referred to ―the danger
of unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of foreign
policy,‖31 and warned courts to be ―wary of impinging on the
discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in managing
foreign affairs.‖32 Unfortunately, despite paying lip service to these
important separation-of-powers principles, the Court subverted the
very principles it claimed to endorse by adopting an opinion that is
starkly at odds with the clearly expressed foreign policy preferences
of the political branches.
To be clear, my objection to the Court‘s opinion in Kiobel is not
about the result. The Court could have justified dismissal of
plaintiffs‘ claims by employing any one of several rationales that are
consistent with U.S. foreign policy interests.33 Instead, the Court
chose to employ a rationale that is antithetical to key U.S. foreign

28. See Ralf Michaels, Empagran’s Empire: International Law and Statutory
Interpretation in the U.S. Supreme Court of the Twenty-First Century, in CONTINUITY AND
CHANGE, supra note 5, at 533, 534.
29. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454–55 (2007);
Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 378 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
30. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (―This
presumption ‗serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of
other nations which could result in international discord.‘‖ (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am.
Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991))).
31. Id.
32. Id. (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004)).
33. See id. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (concurring in the decision to
dismiss plaintiffs‘ claims, but reasoning that the decision is justified because there are not
―distinct American interests at issue‖ in this case, and noting that dismissal might also be
justified in some cases on the basis of recognized doctrines of ―exhaustion, forum non
conveniens, and comity‖).
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policy interests—as those interests have been articulated by the
political branches.
After the Court ordered reargument in Kiobel, it faced a simple,
stark choice. Should the Court adopt a bright-line rule that slams the
door on all human rights claims against foreign defendants under the
ATS? Or should the Court adopt a case-by-case approach that leaves
the courthouse doors open to some human rights claims under the
ATS?34 This is not a new question; it has been with us since the
Second Circuit‘s 1980 decision in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala.35 Since
that time, Congress and several presidents have made it abundantly
clear that they favor the case-by-case approach, not the bright-line
rule, because the case-by-case approach furthers the U.S. foreign
policy interest in promoting vigorous enforcement of international
human rights norms.36
Despite clear evidence that Congress and the Executive Branch
favor the case-by-case approach, the Court in Kiobel adopted a
bright-line rule that it is never appropriate for federal courts acting
―under the ATS to provide a cause of action for conduct occurring in
the territory of another sovereign.‖37 The Court justified that rule by
invoking our foreign policy interest in avoiding ―unintended clashes
between our laws and those of other nations which could result in
international discord.‖38 The Court was undoubtedly right to note that
overly aggressive judicial enforcement of human rights claims under
the ATS could generate unwanted international discord. But the
Kiobel majority was seemingly blind to factors weighing on the other
side of the balance. Its bright-line rule undermines our foreign policy
interest in promoting vigorous enforcement of human rights norms by
slamming the door on virtually all human rights litigation under the
ATS. The political branches have determined that our foreign policy
requires a sensitive, case-by-case balancing of competing interests.
Kiobel upended that balance.
34. The Court‘s decision in Kiobel does not affect human rights claims under the Torture
Victim Protection Act, nor does it affect human rights litigation in state courts. However,
those claims do not rely on the ATS. Absent further congressional legislation, the only
human rights claims that can be litigated under the ATS in the wake of Kiobel are claims
against domestic government officials. Claims against domestic officials have constituted a
small fraction of ATS litigation over the past three decades. See generally BETH STEPHENS ET
AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 281–307 (2d ed. 2008). The
plaintiffs in those cases almost always lose. See id.
35. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.1980).
36. See infra notes 39–54 and accompanying text.
37. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
38. Id. at 1664 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
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The relevant legislative materials demonstrate that Congress has
endorsed the case-by-case balancing approach to human rights
litigation under the ATS. Congress enacted the Torture Victim
Protection Act (TVPA)39 in 1992, largely in response to a circuit split
concerning the appropriate judicial response to ATS human rights
litigation. In Filártiga, the Second Circuit adopted a case-by-case
approach that opened the federal courts to some human rights claims
under the ATS.40 In a separate concurring opinion in Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic,41 Judge Robert Bork advocated a bright-line
rule that would bar all ATS claims, absent express congressional
authorization.42 The legislative history of the TVPA leaves no doubt
that Congress enacted the statute to repudiate Judge Bork‘s brightline rule, and to endorse the Second Circuit‘s case-by-case balancing
approach in Filártiga.43 The statute specifically authorized claims by
or on behalf of victims of torture and summary execution.44
Additionally, both the House and Senate Reports stated, ―claims
based on torture or summary executions do not exhaust the list of
actions that may appropriately be covered by [the ATS].‖45 For
emphasis, the House Report added, ―[The ATS] should remain intact
to permit suits based on other norms that already exist or may ripen
in the future into rules of customary international law.‖46
Both Filártiga and Tel-Oren involved claims based on ―conduct
occurring in the territory of another sovereign.‖47 Moreover, the text
of the TVPA specifically addresses actions taken ―under actual or
apparent authority, or under color of law, of any foreign nation.‖48
Viewed in this context, it is hard to imagine how the Senate and
39. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006)).
40. See Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 882–85.
41. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
42. Id. at 798 (Bork, J., concurring).
43. See S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3–5 (1991); H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 3–4 (1991),
reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 85–86; see also Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks,
Filártiga’s Firm Footing: International Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 513–23 (1997) (providing a detailed review of the legislative history
of the TVPA, and demonstrating that Congress endorsed the Filártiga approach).
44. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note.
45. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 5; H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 4, reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86.
46. H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 4, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86; see also S. REP.
NO. 102-249, at 5 (stating that the ATS ―should remain intact‖).
47. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note.

11-Sloss

2013]

8/28/2013 9:26 PM

KIOBEL: A RULE WITHOUT A RATIONALE

249

House Reports accompanying the TVPA could have provided a
clearer expression of congressional intent. Congress unmistakably
wanted to preserve the option for future plaintiffs to bring ATS
claims based on conduct occurring in other countries to vindicate
human rights norms other than torture and summary execution.
Moreover, Congress sought to preserve human rights litigation under
the ATS to promote U.S. foreign policy goals—specifically, ―to carry
out obligations of the United States under the United Nations Charter
and other international agreements pertaining to the protection of
human rights.‖49
In addition to Congress, the Executive Branch has also endorsed
the case-by-case balancing approach to ATS claims involving human
rights abuses committed on the territory of a foreign sovereign. The
Obama Administration filed two amicus briefs in Kiobel.50 In the
second brief, the Solicitor General argued that ―the Court should not
articulate a categorical rule foreclosing any such application of the
ATS‖ to human rights violations committed on the territory of a
foreign state.51 Instead, he counseled, ―claims based on conduct in a
foreign country should be considered in light of the circumstances in
which they arise.‖52 The position articulated by the Solicitor General
is not based exclusively on legal analysis; it reflects the considered
foreign policy judgment of the Executive Branch. Specifically, the
brief states, ―it is the view of the Department of State that
recognizing a cause of action in the circumstances of Filártiga is
consistent with the foreign relations interests of the United States,
including the promotion of respect for human rights.‖53
All human rights claims against foreign defendants under the
ATS involve a tension between competing foreign policy objectives.
On the one hand, every Republican and Democratic president since
Jimmy Carter has endorsed the principle that the United States should
use its influence in foreign affairs to promote vigorous enforcement

49. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, pmbl., 106 Stat. 73, 73
(1992).
50. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kiobel, 133 S.
Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491); Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in
Partial Support of Affirmance, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491).
51. Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Partial Support of
Affirmance, supra note 50, at 4.
52. Id. at 5; see also id. at 6 (noting that there are circumstances in which a court may
recognize a federal common law cause of action based on the ATS for extraterritorial
violations of the law of nations).
53. Id. at 13.
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of international human rights norms.54 This principle supports a more
plaintiff-friendly approach to ATS litigation that ―leaves the door
ajar‖ for some human rights claims under the ATS.55 On the other
hand, if U.S. courts are overly receptive to ATS claims, ATS
litigation could become a troubling source of tension between the
United States and important allies.56 This factor weighs in favor of a
more defendant-friendly approach to ATS litigation. Prior to Kiobel,
the lower federal courts, as well as the Supreme Court itself in Sosa,
adopted a case-by-case approach that struck a balance between these
competing foreign policy goals.
Despite the Obama Administration‘s forceful argument that the
case-by-case approach is the best way to advance the United States‘
foreign policy agenda, and despite compelling evidence that
Congress endorsed this approach when it adopted the TVPA, the
Supreme Court in Kiobel chose to defy Congress and the President by
adopting a bright-line rule that blocks virtually all human rights
litigation under the ATS. The Court professed fealty to the principle
that courts should not impinge ―on the discretion of the Legislative
and Executive Branches in managing foreign affairs.‖57 But the
Court‘s judicially created bright-line rule significantly limits the
range of Executive discretion by removing one tool—case-by-case
support for ATS litigation—that several presidents have found to be a
useful tool for communicating the United States‘ support for vigorous
enforcement of international human rights norms. Thus, the Supreme
Court decision in Kiobel contravenes core separation-of-powers
principles. In a case raising sensitive foreign policy concerns, the
Supreme Court had the audacity to invoke a judicial foreign policy
rationale to support a legal position directly contrary to the clearly
expressed foreign policy preferences of the federal political branches.

54. See generally DAVID WEISSBRODT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW,
POLICY, AND PROCESS 672–701 (4th ed. 2009).
55. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004) (―Whereas Justice Scalia
sees these developments as sufficient to close the door to further independent judicial
recognition of actionable international norms, other considerations persuade us that the
judicial power should be exercised on the understanding that the door is still ajar subject to
vigilant doorkeeping . . . .‖).
56. See, e.g., Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 2009) (dismissing ATS claims against
a former high-ranking Israeli government officer).
57. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (quoting Sosa,
542 U.S. at 727).

11-Sloss

2013]

8/28/2013 9:26 PM

KIOBEL: A RULE WITHOUT A RATIONALE

251

IV. THE DOMESTIC JUDICIAL POLICY RATIONALE
The stark contrast between Chief Justice Roberts‘ foreign
relations rhetoric and his willful disregard for the actual foreign
policy preferences of the political branches suggests that there may
be a different, unstated rationale for the Court‘s extraterritoriality
holding in Kiobel. Professor Paul Stephan has suggested one possible
rationale to explain the presumption against extraterritoriality. He
argues that the modern Supreme Court ―has concluded that there is
something exceptional and possibly unwise about the way the United
States conducts civil litigation.‖58 Professor Stephan notes that
―unique features of U.S. civil justice include a right to a jury trial, no
risk that plaintiffs will pay the other side‘s attorneys fees, generous
and intrusive pretrial discovery, the class action device, and the
possibility of super-compensatory recoveries.‖59 These features of the
U.S. civil litigation system, which are not present in most other
advanced industrial democracies, tend to tilt the scales in favor of
plaintiffs. For that reason, among others, several of the United States‘
closest allies have objected to the extraterritorial application of U.S.
laws.60 Professor Stephan contends that the Court shares their
concerns. He says, ―The modern Court has not sought to undo the
progressive reforms of civil litigation . . . . It has, however, tried to
construct boundaries on civil litigation, especially in areas that entail
substantial judicial discretion and modest legislative guidance.‖61
Thus, the presumption against extraterritoriality can be understood as
one of the boundaries the Court has erected to restrain the perceived
excesses of the U.S. civil litigation system.
The Court‘s effort to constrain civil litigation links its
extraterritoriality jurisprudence to its ATS jurisprudence. In Sosa, the
Court held that the ATS authorizes federal courts to create a federal
common law cause of action to enforce international norms,62 but the
Court sharply limited the scope of that cause of action and urged
58. Paul B. Stephan, Response Essay – Empagran: Empire Building or Judicial
Modesty?, in CONTINUITY AND CHANGE, supra note 5, at 553.
59. Id. at 554.
60. For example, in Kiobel, the Dutch and British governments filed an amicus brief
highlighting the unique features of the U.S. civil litigation system and urging the Court to
impose restraints on the extraterritorial application of the ATS. See Brief of the Governments
of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 5–6, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491).
61. Stephan, supra note 58, at 555.
62. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.
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lower courts to be cautious in exercising their statutory authority. 63 In
Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.,64 the Court applied the
presumption against extraterritoriality to limit the ability of private
plaintiffs to bring civil suits to enforce federal securities laws.65 In
both cases, judicially imposed limits on civil suits to enforce federal
statutes—the Alien Tort Statute in Sosa and the Securities Exchange
Act in Morrison—manifest the Court‘s desire to erect boundaries to
constrain the perceived excesses of private civil litigation.
I cannot say that Professor Stephan‘s analysis is incorrect, but I
believe it is incomplete. A more comprehensive analysis would have
to account for the large body of case law in which the Court has
enthusiastically endorsed civil litigation as a tool to enforce judicially
created constitutional norms. An analysis along these lines might be
summarized in three points. First, the Court uses its control over the
litigation process to encourage civil litigation in which plaintiffs seek
to enforce judicially created constitutional norms—especially
constitutional norms that restrict Congress‘ lawmaking power.66
Second, the Court uses its control over the litigation process to create
obstacles for civil plaintiffs who seek to enforce democratically
created statutory norms embodied in federal legislation enacted by
Congress.67 Third, as exemplified by its recent decision in Kiobel, the
Court uses its control over the litigation process to create obstacles
for civil plaintiffs who seek to enforce international norms rooted in a
broad-based international consensus.68
A detailed defense of these claims is well beyond the scope of
this Essay. Even so, a comparison of two recent Supreme Court
decisions involving federal health care regulation illustrates the
central point. In Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern

63. Id. at 725–28.
64. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
65. Id. at 2881–83.
66. See, e.g., Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (holding that
the Medicaid expansion provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
exceeded Congress‘ power under the Spending Clause); Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct.
876 (2010) (holding that federal statute barring independent corporate expenditures for
electioneering communications violated the First Amendment).
67. See, e.g., Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (restricting extraterritorial application of federal
securities laws); F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004)
(restricting extraterritorial application of federal antitrust law).
68. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
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California, Inc.,69 plaintiffs sued to enforce a provision of the federal
Medicaid statute.70 Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito joined a
dissent authored by Chief Justice Roberts in which he argued that the
plaintiffs lacked a private right of action71 and therefore could not
bring suit to enforce a federal statutory norm. According to the
dissent, plaintiffs cannot sue to enforce a statutory norm endorsed by
Congress unless they can also identify a statute that explicitly
authorizes them to file suit.72 (In fact, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a federal
statute that authorized private lawsuits in cases like Douglas until the
Supreme Court adopted a narrowing construction that restricted the
use of § 1983 to enforce federal statutory norms.)73
Compare Douglas to National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius,74 where private plaintiffs sued to invalidate key
provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. By
asking the Court to invalidate a federal statute, the plaintiffs
effectively invited the Court to engage in constitutional lawmaking,
an invitation that the Court eagerly accepted.75 In Sebelius, the
plaintiffs could not identify any statute that authorized them to file
suit. Even so, no Justice questioned whether they had a private right
of action. Under current Supreme Court doctrine, plaintiffs do not
need statutory authorization to file a suit in which they invite a court
to engage in constitutional lawmaking to invalidate a democratically
enacted federal statute. However, plaintiffs do need statutory
authorization to file a suit in which they ask a court to enforce a
democratically enacted federal statute.76 Thus, the Court‘s private
right of action doctrine privileges judicial lawmaking over
69. 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012).
70. Id. at 1209.
71. Id. at 1211–15 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
72. See id. at 1211–13.
73. In Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980), the Court held that § 1983 ―was intended
to provide a remedy, to be broadly construed, against all forms of official violation of
federally protected rights.‖ Id. at 5 (quoting Monell v. Dep‘t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
700–02 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Twenty years later, though, in Gonzaga
University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002), the Court effectively restricted the use of § 1983 to
enforce (democratically created) statutory norms, while preserving § 1983 as a broad remedy
to enforce (judicially created) constitutional norms. The question presented in Douglas
would never even have arisen if the Court had not previously engaged in judicial policy
making in Gonzaga to restrict the use of § 1983 to enforce statutory norms.
74. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
75. In Sebelius, the Court created a new, unprecedented constitutional limitation on
Congress‘ Commerce Power. Id. at 2585–93. It also held for the first time since the 1930s
that Congress had acted beyond the scope of its constitutional power under the Spending
Clause. See id. at 2633–40.
76. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283–84.
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democratic lawmaking: the Court has invented a set of procedural
rules that restrict access to court for plaintiffs who seek to enforce
democratically created statutory norms, while granting access to
court for plaintiffs who seek to enforce judicially created
constitutional norms.
This pattern of judicial decision-making is deeply disturbing.
The Supreme Court encourages federal courts to employ their judicial
power to enforce constitutional norms created by the Supreme Court
because the Court favors judicial lawmaking that it controls. In
contrast, the Supreme Court erects obstacles for plaintiffs who seek
to enforce statutory or international law norms because those norms
are the product of lawmaking processes that the Court does not and
cannot control. Thus, instead of portraying the Court‘s
extraterritoriality jurisprudence as evidence of the Court‘s skepticism
about civil litigation, as Professor Stephan suggests, one might
reasonably conclude that the Court‘s jurisprudence manifests judicial
hostility to democratic lawmaking processes.
CONCLUSION
This Essay has identified four different rationales for the
presumption against extraterritoriality. In the nineteenth century, the
Court invoked an international law rationale to justify the
presumption against extraterritoriality. Today, the international law
rationale provides little support for the Supreme Court‘s
extraterritoriality jurisprudence because international law imposes
very weak constraints on the extraterritorial application of U.S. law,
whereas the Court seeks to impose much tighter constraints. In the
mid-twentieth century the Court adopted a domestic political science
rationale to justify the presumption against extraterritoriality. That
rationale remains valid today, but it provides no support for those
who seek to restrict the extraterritorial application of the ATS.
The Court has never explicitly invoked a domestic judicial
policy rationale to justify its extraterritoriality jurisprudence. Even
so, Professor Stephan makes a plausible argument that the domestic
judicial policy rationale helps illuminate the normative judgments
implicit in the Court‘s extraterritoriality jurisprudence. However,
instead of portraying the Court‘s extraterritoriality jurisprudence as
evidence of the Court‘s skepticism about civil litigation, as Professor
Stephan suggests, one might reasonably conclude that the Court‘s
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jurisprudence manifests judicial hostility to democratic lawmaking
processes.
In the past decade, the Court has sometimes invoked an
international relations rationale to justify the presumption against
extraterritoriality. Applied with proper sensitivity, the Court could
use the international relations rationale to support the Executive
Branch in its careful, case-by-case balancing of competing foreign
policy concerns. Unfortunately, in the hands of Chief Justice Roberts
in Kiobel, the international relations rationale became a blunt weapon
that the Court‘s majority used to impose its own foreign policy
preferences in opposition to key foreign policy goals endorsed by the
political branches. Congress and the President have made it
abundantly clear that they want to use the U.S. legal system in a
limited set of cases to help promote enforcement of widely accepted
international human rights norms. In Kiobel, the Supreme Court
invoked an international relations rationale to justify application of
the presumption against extraterritoriality, and applied that
presumption to subvert the international human rights policies of the
federal political branches.

